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SELLER'S LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE DESIGN-THE
MEASURE OF RESPONSIBILITY
Courts have recognized the individual's right to be free of injuries
caused by defective products' and have developed the doctrine of strict
products liability to hold the product seller to a higher degree of liability
than he faced under negligence theory.' Liability in negligence for prod-
uct-caused injuries is based on breach of the duty of a reasonable, pru-
dent seller to exercise due care on behalf of a person to whom the duty is
owed.3 In strict products liability, the plaintiff need not prove negligent
conduct amounting to a breach of due care by the seller, but need only
prove that the product was defective.' Yet courts stop short of imposing
unlimited liability upon the product seller.5 The seller's liability and the
'See 1 R. HUsH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LLArU'rY (SECOND) § 1:5 (2d
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as HuRsH & BAILEY]; Wade, A Conspectus of Manufacturers'
Liability for Products, 10 IND. L. Rzv. 755, 756-58 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Wade, Con-
spectus]. The term "products liability" describes the liability incurred after injuries caused
by defective products. Injuries and losses caused by a condition on the premises, or by the
rendering of a service are not proper subjects for a products liability claim. W. KIMBLE & R.
LESHER, PRODUCTS LABmITY § 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as KIMBLE & LESHER].
2 Strict products liability has eliminated the requirement of proof of negligence in order
to effectuate a social policy of consumer protection. See KIMBLE & LESHER, supra note 1, § 2;
note 6 infra.
HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 1, § 2:2. In negligence the manufacturer's duty of due
care extends to the design, manufacture, construction, and packaging of the product, as well
as to the preparation of adequate instructions. KIMBLE & LESHER, supra note 1, § 12. The
manufacturer's duty also extends to the inspection and testing of the product. Id.; see gener-
ally Abell, The Manufacturer's Duty to Test And Inspect, in PRODUCT LBmrrY: LAw, PRAC-
Tim, ScINcE 247 (P. Rheingold & S. Birnbaum eds. 1975). A nonmanufacturing seller such
as a retailer or wholesaler is not liable in negligence for the manufacturer's breaches of duty,
but he may be liable for a breach of his own duty where he has one. HURSH & BAILEY, supra
note 1, §§ 2:10 & 2:11.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, _, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 700 (1963); RESTATEMENT, (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment g (1965) [herein-
after cited as RESTATEMENT 402A]; Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Prod-
ucts, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 825, 829 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Wade, Nature]. One commenta-
tor has advocated that strict products liability should not be based on defectiveness, but
upon causation. He asserts that if a product is a substantial cause of an injury, courts should
impose liability on the seller of the product. Comment, A California Perspective on Strict
Products Liability, 9 PAC. L.J. 775, 793, 797 (1978). Courts, however, have disagreed. See
note 5 infra.
Unlimited liability, often termed absolute liability, subjects the seller to liability any
time one of his products is involved in an accident. For example, Ford Motor Company
would be liable for every accident in which a Ford was involved. Wade, Conspectus, supra
note 1, at 768; Wade, Nature, supra note 4, at 828. Strict liability for products is not unlim-
ited liability. E.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 879 (Alas. 1979); Center
Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 869, 218 S.E.2d 580, 582 (1975); Hunt v. Blasius, 74 Ill.
2d 203, -, 384 N.E.2d 368, 372 (1978); Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66, 70
(Ky. 1973); Azzarello v. Black Bros., 480 Pa. 547, _-, 391 A.2d 1020, 1024 (1978);
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plaintiffs right to compensation are contingent upon the existence of a
defect in the product.' The extent of the seller's liability and the plain-
tiff's right to compensation depend upon the definition of defect utilized
in a particular jurisdiction.7
The existence of a manufacturing defect usually is obvious and poses
few analytical difficulties for the courts,' because manufacturing defects
result from physical flaws in the product and generally become apparent
upon comparison with unflawed units of the same manufacture.' No such
objective standard of comparison exists for design defects, however, be-
cause they do not result from faulty construction, but can only be
ascribed to the designer's faulty judgment."0 To determine if a product is
Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 680 (W. Va. 1979); Dippel v.
Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, ._ 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967). Courts have also held that negligence
and breach of warranty do not subject the product seller to unlimited liability. E.g., Garst v.
General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, _., 484 P.2d 47, 61 (1971); Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg.,
Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Ky. 1973); Fisher v. Johnson Milk Co., 383 Mich. 158, 160, 174
N.W.2d 752, 754 (1970); Stevens v. Durbin-Durco, Inc., 377 S.W.2d 343, 346-47 (Mo. 1964);
Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 251, 217 S.W.2d 863, 868 (1975).
1 RESTATEMENT 402A, supra note 4; HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 1, § 4:11 at nn. 45 & 46.
Section 402A reads as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substan-
tial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
See Traynor, The Ways And Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. REv. 363, 366 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Traynor]. Courts have utilized a number
of tests to determine defectiveness, including deviation from the norm, unfitness for in-
tended purpose, the test of RESTATEMENT 402A, supra note 4, and tests based on the balanc-
ing of the risks of a product against its utility. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d
871, 880-83 (Alas. 1979). See also text accompanying notes 19-33 infra.
I See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 880 (Alas. 1979); Henderson, Judi-
cial Review of Manufacturer's Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73
COLuM. L. REv. 1531, 1542-44 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Henderson]; Hoenig, Products
Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a Better Approach?, 8 Sw. U.L. REv. 108, 118
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Hoenig]. An example of a manufacturing defect is where an alu-
minum hasp securing bread trays in a delivery truck snaps because the metal is too porous.
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). The
natural application of the term "defect" is to a situation where a mistake has occurred in
the process of manufacture, so that the product is not as intended by the manufacturer.
Wade, Nature, supra note 4, at 831-32.
1 Henderson, supra note 8, at 1543. The relative ease with which courts are able to
identify manufacturing defects is due to the fact that the manufacturer's intended design
provides a "ready-made standard" with which to compare the allegedly defective product.
Id. at 1544. -
1* Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 880 (Alas. 1979); Cronin v. J.B.E. Ol-
son Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 134, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972); Barker v.
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defectively designed, a court must substitute its own judgment for that of
the designer by establishing standards against which the design can be
evaluated."1
The most significant policy guiding the formulation of standards for
product design is the -policy of risk-spreading.12 According to risk-spread-
ing theory, the seller is better able to bear the economic costs of the harm
caused by his products than the injured consumer or user, because the
seller can spread the cost of the harm by including it in the price of his
products, or by purchasing liability insurance. 3 Risk-spreading provides
Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 417-18, 573 P.2d 443, 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 228 (1978);
Hoenig, supra note 8, at 121. An example of defective product design is an earth-moving
machine with a blind spot caused by a large engine box, and no rear view mirror to enable
the operator to avoid persons standing in the blind spot. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal.
3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970); see also West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336
So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976). The lack of a safety device, such as a rear view mirror, is discussed in
Black, Optional Safety Devices: How Strict The Liability?, 8 N.M.L. REv. 191 (1979).
Black's basic conclusion is that multipurpose machinery is not defective simply because the
different safety devices necessary for each use of the machine are offered as options. Id. at
209. Therefore, only those safety devices common to all or most of the machine's uses must
be included as standard features. Id. at 194; see also Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593
P.2d 871, 891-92 (1978). Design defects are not limited to a lack of safety devices, but may
include any feature of the product that can cause injury, such as a starting lever placed in a
location where it may be brushed against inadvertantly, Suter v. San Angelo Foundry &
Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979), or a gearshift knob manufactured from a type
of plastic that cracks upon exposure to sunlight. Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166
S.E.2d 173 (1969).
," Henderson, supra note 8, at 1533; Hoenig, supra note 8, at 121. Henderson subdivides
design defects into two categories: inadvertent design errors and conscious design choices.
Inadvertant design errors resemble manufacturing defects, because they are unintended and
usually cause the product to fail. Conscious design choices are intended, normally do not
interfere with the product's function, and are usually obvious to the user. Henderson, supra
note 8, at 1547-50. Henderson asserts that inadvertant design errors and manufacturing de-
fects are appropriate subjects for judicial evaluation because the manufacturer's intended
design operates as a readily available objective standard. He argues that conscious design
choices cannot be evaluated by objective standards, but present 'polycentric' issues that
courts as institutions are ill-equipped to handle. Id. at 1550-53.
1" See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 877 (Alas. 1979); West v. Caterpil-
lar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 92 (Fla. 1976); Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of
Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 35 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Keeton]. The policies and con-
siderations that have influenced the development of strict liability for products have in-
cluded allocation of the cost of injuries to suppliers of products, consumer protection, and
providing incentives to manufacturers to produce safer products. See generally Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d at 877; Azzarello v. Black Bros., 480 Pa. 547, _, 391 A.2d
1020, 1023-24 (1978); Smith v. Smith, - S.D. 278 N.W.2d 155, 160 (1979); Keeton,
supra, at 34-35.
11 See note 12 supra. The assumption that the manufacturer is able to include the costs
of product liability awards in his product pricing has been criticized. E.g., Plant, Strict
Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused By Defects in Products-An Opposing View,
24 TEN. L. REv. 938, 945-48 (1957); Hoenig, supra note 8, at 129-31. But see Escola v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring);
O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Protection For Product and Other Accidents, The Society of
Chartered Property & Casualty Underwriters, Products Liability Monograph at 19 (April
1976) [hereinafter cited as O'Connell] (quoting statistics showing products liability compen-
S1980]
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consumer protection both by compensating the injured and by giving eco-
nomic incentive to manufacturers to develop safer products. 4 Taken to its
logical extreme, risk-spreading would impose liability on the seller for all
injuries caused by his products without regard to defectiveness or reasona-
ble care in manufacturing the products. 5 Courts have rejected such un-
limited liability," but because courts must substitute their own judgment
for that of the designer, they have found it difficult to avoid analyzing
defective designs in negligence terms 7 which focus on the manufacturer's
conduct of the design process."8 The courts have concluded that a defini-
tion of defective design appropriate to strict products liability should be
based on the policy of risk-spreading, should impose a higher degree of
liability than negligence, but should not impose unlimited liability.
One definition of defective design is based on a consumer expectation
test." If the product fails to perform as the reasonable consumer would
expect, the product is defective. 0 A product will not satisfy the con-
sumer's reasonable expectations if it creates a danger that it is meant to
prevent or remedy,2' or if it fails to perform its intended function.2 A
sation of only a few percent of actual medical costs).
Hoenig emphasizes that insurance coverage for claims based on design defects is either
too expensive or unavailable for most manufacturers to carry. Hoenig, supra note 8, at 130.
Products liability insurance is discussed generally in Henderson, Insurance Protection for
Products Liability and Completed Operations-What Every Lawyer Should Know, 50 NEB.
L. Ray. 415 (1971).
" See note 12 supra. Enterprise liability is a concept closely related to risk-spreading
and is predicated upon the judgment that the going business concern should bear the full
costs of its activities, including the costs of product-caused harm. Enterprise liability has
provided the basis for holding successor corporations responsible for the defective products of
a predecessor corporation. E.g., Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d
873 (1976). See generally Comment, Extension of Strict Tort Liability to Successor Corpora-
tions, 61 MARQ. L. Rxv. 595 (1978).
1 Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 889 (Alas. 1979); Henderson, supra note
8, at 1554; Hoenig, supra note 8, at 129-30.
' See note 5 supra.
'7 See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 99 at 659 n.72 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PaOSSER]; Hoenig, supra note 8, at 121. When faced with the difficulty
of distinguishing strict products liability from negligence liability for defective designs, some
courts have held that all defective designs are to be determined by use of a negligence test.
E.g., Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr., 121 Ariz. 253, -, 589 P.2d 896, 902 (Ariz. App. 1978).
, See text accompanying note 3 supra.
" E.g., RESTATEMENT 402A, supra note 4, Comment i. Section 402A defines a defective
product as one in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous." See note 4 supra. Com-
ment i gives content to this definition by formulating a test based upon the extent of danger
that would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer "with the ordinary knowledge com-
mon to the community." The definition of § 402A has been criticized as creating two sepa-
rate requirements; that the product be unreasonably dangerous and that it be defective.
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1161-62, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433,
442 (1972). But see Wade, Nature, supra note 4, at 830-31 ('defective condition' and 'unrea-
sonably dangerous' almost synonymous and meant to explain each other).
" Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 170-71, 406 A.2d 140, 150
(1979).
1, An example of a situation where a product causes a harm that it was designed to
DEFECTIVE DESIGN
product also fails to meet the consumer's reasonable expectations if it has
unanticipated, adverse side effects,2 or if it does not minimize injuries
that would ordinarily occur in accidents involving the product 4.2
The consumer expectation test has been criticized because it does not
provide adequate guidance to the trier of fact when the product is so com-
plex that an ordinary consumer would not know what to expect2 and be-
cause the manufacturer may not be held liable for an injury he could eas-
ily prevent, simply because the danger is obvious to the consumer.
26
Because of these criticisms of the consumer expectation test, some courts
adopt a risk-utility test which balances the risks posed by the product
design against the benefits or utility of the design.? The considerations
involved in balancing risks against utility include the usefulness of and
prevent occurs when administration of a polio vaccine causes polio. Gottsdanker v. Cutler
Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Dickerson, The
ABC's of Products Liability-With a Close Look at Section 402A and the Code, 36 TENN. L.
Ray. 439, 454 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Dickerson].
2 Brakes that fail are an example of a product that fails to perform its intended func-
tion. Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 171, 406 A.2d 140, 150 (1979);
Dickerson, supra note 21, at 454.
21 An example of an unanticipated side effect is when emphysema is caused by cigarette
smoking, Dickerson, supra note 21, at 454, or when a drug designed for treatment of arterio-
sclerosis causes cataracts. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 398 (1967).
214 Cases where injuries are not caused by the defect, but where the product could have
minimized those injuries, are called 'enhanced injury' or 'second collision' cases. The typical
enhanced injury case involves an automobile accident in which the injuries were exacerbated
by some feature of the car, such as an unpadded dashboard. See generally Note, Products
Liability-The "Enhanced Injury Case" Revisited, 8 FORUM 643 (1973).
23 Keeton, supra note 12, at 37; Wade, Nature, supra note 4, at 833-34.
24 Where an above-ground swimming pool is designed without a gate that would prevent
children from entering it, the pool may meet ordinary consumer expectations, both because
the danger is obvious and because children are not ordinary consumers. The pool.manufac-
turer would thus escape liability, even though a gate would be a simple, inexpensive, and
effective method to prevent children from drowning. See Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Alu-
minum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975); A. WEINSTEIN, A. TWER-
SKi, H. PmHLER & W. DONAHER, PRODUCTS LABiLmrY AND THE REASONABLY SAFE PRODUCT § 4.3
(1978) [hereinafter cited as TwERSKI].
2 E.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 886 (Alas. 1979); Barker v. Lull
Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 435, 573 P.2d 443, 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239-40 (1978); Suter
v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 170, 406 A.2d 140, 150 (1979). Risk-utility
balancing has been applied in areas other than the products liability field. For example, an
Oregon court formulated a test based on gravity of harm weighed against utility to deter-
mine whether the noise from a nearby airport amounts to such a nuisance as to constitute a
taking of the plaintiff's land for which he must be compensated. Thornburg v. Port of Port-
land, 233 Ore. 178, _, 376 P.2d 100, 107 (1962).
u See generally Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 237 (1978); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 681 n.20 (W.
Va. 1978); Wade, Nature, supra note 4, at 837-38. An example of a risk-utility balancing
may involve a steam vaporizer which falls when a child trips over its electric cord. The child
is badly burned when the lift-off cap falls from the overturned vaporizer, spilling hot water
on the child. A vaporizer has obvious utility for those suffering from colds and the water
must be hot for the vaporizer to function. However, such accidents are likely to occur since
19801
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the need for the product, 9 the economic and mechanical feasibility of a
safer design," the product's propensity for causing harm,3 the gravity of
the injuries caused by the product,32 and the user's ability to avoid injury
by proper use of the product."
One of the risk-utility considerations, the economic and mechanical
feasibility of a safer design, evaluates product defectiveness by determin-
ing if a safer, alternative product could have been designed.34 The plaintiff
must prove that the safer design was both economically practical and
technologically possible. 5 Evidence of state of the art is generally ad-
missable on the issue of feasibility of a safer design.36 State of the art
vaporizers are commonly used in dark bedrooms. The burns produced by such accidents can
be quite severe. Such an accident could be avoided easily and economically by using a
screw-on cap instead of a lift-off cap. Since the accident is so likely, so severe, and so easily
preventable, the manufacturer is liable for the vaporizer's defective design. See TWERSKI,
supra note 26, § 3.5 (discussing McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d
488 (1967)).
" The usefulness of and need for a product involves a subjective evaluation by the court
or trier of fact. Glass doors have great social utility because they give apartment dwellers a
feeling of spaciousness and closeness to nature, in spite of the danger that someone will
attempt to walk through the clear glass while the door is closed. Metal Window Prods. Co. v.
Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). Drugs such as penicillin and cor-
tisone have great utility and social value, in spite of possible adverse side effects. PRossER,
supra note 17, § 99 at 661.
" See text accompanying notes 34-41 infra.
"' See text accompanying notes 42-44 infra.
32 The gravity or seriousness of the injuries caused by a product is a consideration that
may be redundant, since few plaintiffs will bring a case unless they have been injured seri-
ously enough to find the bother and expense of litigation worthwhile. See O'Connell, supra
note 13, at 19-20. O'Connell cites statistical evidence to show that very few injuries to con-
sumers are ever compensated because of the barriers imposed by litigation. Id.
" See text accompanying notes 45-51 infra.
3 Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
237 (1978); Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 91 Wash. 2d 345, 351, 588 P.2d 1346, 1350
(1979). In Lamon, the plaintiff fell through an emergency hatch located in the aisle of an
airplane into the galley below. The hatch lid had to be removed to open the hatchway but a
safer design existed which used a hinged hatch cover with a closing spring. Had the safer
design been used, the plaintiff would not have fallen, since the hatch cover would have auto-
matically closed itself. Therefore the hatchway was defective.
In Auburn Mach. Wks. Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979) plaintiffs leg was
amputated because he fell into the exposed chain of a trench digging machine. The court
noted that, while the danger of the exposed chain was obvious, a guard over the chain would
have eliminated the danger and that the $200-$500 cost of such a guard on an $8,000 ma-
chine was not unreasonable. Id. at 1170. The court also noted that the installation of a guard
would not have impaired the machine's function. Id. Similarly in Kerns v. Engelke, 76 Ill.
2d 154, 390 N.E.2d 859 (1979) the court noted with approval evidence showing feasible alter-
native designs that were economical, practical, and effective. Id. at _, 390 N.E.2d at 864. In
Olson v. Arctic Enterprises, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.D. 1972) the court held that the
plaintiff's alternative design was not feasible. The plaintiff suggested that had his snowmo-
bile used rubber tracks instead of metal tracks, his injuries would have been prevented or
reduced. The design was not feasible because at the time of the snowmobile's manufacture,
the industry had not yet developed a type of rubber which could withstand cold and stress
without being subject to premature failure. Id. at 765.
3 KIMBLE & LEsHER, supra note 1, § 228. But see Bailey v. Boatland of Houston, Inc.,
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includes the issue of whether the product complies with industry customs
and standards, 7 as well as government regulations.3 Where industry cus-
tom or government regulations are non-existent or have lagged behind
technological progress, 9 state of the art includes the issue of whether the
product is as safe as the most advanced technology can make it." Where
the most advanced technology is the standard against which the product
is evaluated, that technology must also be practical in terms of cost.4'
The propensity of a product for causing harm is a risk-utility consider-
ation that may involve a subjective evaluation of the likelihood that the
product will cause harm or may involve objective, statistical evidence
585 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979). The Bailey plaintiff alleged that a drowning accident
could have been prevented had the boat been equipped with a kill switch that would shut off
the engine automatically when the operator fell overboard. Id. at 807. Reasoning that the
focus should be on the product and not on the thinking behind the manufacturer's adoption
of the design, id. at 810, the court held that evidence of the state of the art which estab-
lished that kill switches were commercially unavailable when the boat was manufactured,
was not admissible in a strict products liability action. Id. at 807, 811. The issue presented
by feasibility is not whether the manufacturer exercised care, as the court identified the
issue, id. at 810, but whether this product is defective because another and safer design was
feasible. In Bailey the alternative design may not have been feasible because it was not
available. Id. at 808. Proof of the feasibility of a safer, alternative design should be based
upon empirical evidence of the practicality of the alternative design, according to one com-
mentator, who notes that courts often accept expert testimony based on untested hypotheti-
cal designs. O'Donnell, Design Litigation and the State of the Art: Terminology, Practice
and Reform, 11 AKRON L. REV. 627, 659-61 (1978) [hereinafter cited as O'Donnell].
Henderson, supra note 8, at 1556-57. Henderson describes industry custom as custom-
ary design choices made by the majority of manufacturers of a specific category of product.
Id. He describes industry standards as industry custom which becomes codified into formal
industry codes. Id. See generally Note, Admissibility of Safety Codes, Rules and Standards
in Negligence Cases, 37 TENN. L. Rav. 581 (1970). Henderson asserts that industry codes and
standards are more susceptible to abuse and partiality than government standards and that,
therefore, the wisdom of using industry standards in the judicial process is doubtful. Hen-
derson, supra note 8, at 1556.
I Henderson, supra note 8, at 1555-56. Courts view government regulations as establish-
ing minimum safety standards, thus a product may be defective even though it complies
with government standards. Id. However, government regulations are persuasive authority
on the issue of defectiveness. Id.; KYmLE & LnsHER, supra note 1, § 233(B).
3, In The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Eastern Transp. Co.
v. Northern Barge Corp., 287 U.S. 662 (1932), the court held that where radio sets were
practical and would have warned a tugboat of an approaching storm and prevented the sink-
ing of the barges it towed, the fact that almost no other tugboats had installed radio sets
could not absolve the defendant of liability. Id. at 740. The T.J. Hooper has been accepted
as authority for the proposition that the standards and customs of an industry are not con-
clusive evidence of due care or of non-defectiveness. See KIMBLE & LESHER, supra note 1, §
224; O'Donnell, supra note 36, at 649-51.
40 KiMBL & LaSHER, supra note 1, § 224.
"1 See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 883 (Alas. 1979); Wade, Nature,
supra note 4, at 837.
11 A subjective evaluation of the likelihood that a product will cause harm would be
based on opinion testimony not supported by statistical evidence of accident frequency. E.g.,
Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 91 Wash. 2d 345, 348-49, 588 P.2d 1346, 1348-50 (1979).
An engineer's affidavit stated that the design of a hatch cover in a DC-10 was dangerous
because it was likely that the user would forget to replace the hatch cover, leaving an open
19801
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that the product does or does not often cause harm. 3 Evidence that a
product is likely to or often does cause harm indicates that the product is
defective because the product should have been designed to prevent the
harm."
Another consideration in the risk-utility analysis is the user's ability to
avoid injury by proper use of the product." If the plaintiff puts the prod-
uct to an abnormal use, the seller is not liable for any injuries that re-
sult.4" Abnormal use differs from contributory negligence, because the is-
sue in the former is not the plaintiff's fault relative to that of the
defendant, but whether the product is defective.47 The manufacturer must
design the product to withstand some degree of abuse," but courts differ
in their determination of when that abuse rises to the level of an abnor-
mal use which the law will not require the product to withstand." Courts
generally apply one of two tests to determine whether the product has
been abnormally used. The 'intended use' test would not find the product
defective if the plaintiff has used the product in some way unintended by
the manufacturer. The 'foreseeable use' test recognizes that products are
often used for purposes other than those intended by the manufacturer;
therefore it requires the manufacturer to design a product that can with-
stand any use reasonably forseeable.5 '
hole in the aisle of the aircraft into which a stewardess could fall. Id.
"Power lawnmowers are an example of a product for which a great deal of statistical
information as to frequency of injuries is available. See, e.g., 1 L. FRumER & M. FRIEDMAN,
PRoDucTs LIABLrrY § 1 at n.3 (1979) (quoting statistics that 80,000 persons are injured annu-
ally by power mowers).
11 Wade, Nature, supra note 4, at 837.
,5 See generally Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and
Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. Rzv. 93 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Noel]. Noel states that
abnormal use bars the plaintiff's recovery. Id. at 100. If the abnormal use is so abnormal as
to establish that the product is not defective, it is true that the plaintiff's recovery will be
barred, but the issue is one of degree. For example, some jurisdictions hold that a product
may be defective if it is not designed to protect against foreseeable misuses, as where a
woman stands on a chair. Id. at 96-97.
46 Noel, supra note 45, at 95. An example of an abnormal use is where a bottle is
knocked against a radiator to remove the lid. RESTATEMENT 402A, supra note 4, Comment h.
11 Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 193, 406 A.2d 140, 162 (1979)
(Clifford, J., concurring); Wade, Nature, supra note 4, at 846-47.
" See note 45, supra.
, Noel points out that the degree of misuse which a product must be designed to with-
stand should be determined by an objective standard imposed by law and not by a standard
based on the actual knowledge of the particular manufacturer before the court. Noel, supra
note 45, at 98-99.
10 See Noel, supra note 45, at 97-98; Wade, Nature, supra note 4, at 847. An 'intended
use' test permits the manufacturer to limit the scope of his liability. Id. The term 'intended
use' could also mean those uses intended by the consumer, rather than the manufacturer.
The term does not seem to be used often in the sense of the consumer's intent. But see
Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.W.2d 666, 682 (W. Va. 1979).
5 Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 887 (Alas. 1979); Anderson v. Hyster
Co., 74 Ill. 2d 364, _, 385 N.E.2d 690, 693 (1979). It may be foreseeable that a power takeoff
unit will be wired in place while the forage blower to which it is attached is being moved to a
new location, because it is inconvenient to fully remove the power takeoff unit. It may even
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Some recent design defect decisions have adopted risk-utility or both
the risk-utility and consumer expectation tests. In Suter v. San Angelo
Foundry & Machine Co.5" the New Jersey Supreme Court approved a de-
sign defect definition based upon both the consumer expectation test53
and the risk-utility analysis." The plaintiff in Suter was a part owner and
employee of a metal fabricating company.55 His hand was crushed in the
rollers of a machine manufactured by San Angelo Foundry when he
reached inside the machine and his body brushed against the lever which
started the rollers.58 The Suter court held that New Jersey's comparative
negligence statute57 applied to strict products liability,58 but that Suter
was entitled to full compensation for his injuries" because, as a matter of
law, an employee injured in an industrial setting is not guilty of compara-
tive negligence." In so holding, the court reasoned that the legislative in-
be foreseeable that while the power takeoff is being unwired and reconnected, the wire will
fly up into a workman's eye. See Kerns v. Engelke, 76 fI1. 2d 154, -, 390 N.E.2d 859, 864-65
(1979).
52 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
0 See text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 27-33 supra.
" 81 N.J. at 154, 406 A.2d at 141. The plaintiff's company fabricated heating and air
conditioning ducts. Id.
5' 81 N.J. at 157, 406 A.2d at 143. The machine which crushed the plaintiff's hand was
used to curve metal sheets into cylindrical shapes. The motor which drives the rollers was
ordinarily left running. The rollers would turn only if the motor was running and a lever was
thrown to engage them to the motor. It was this lever against which the plaintiff accidentally
brushed. Id.
51 Comparative Negligence Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 15-5.1 to 5.3 (West Cum. Supp.
1979).
-" 81 N.J. at 164, 177, 406 A.2d at 147, 153. In strict products liability, comparative
negligence is an affirmative defense based not upon the plaintiffs negligence, but upon his
assumption of the risk. 81 N.J. at 193-99, 406 A.2d at 162-65 (Clifford J., concurring); see
HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 1, § 4:36. The plaintiffs negligence will ordinarily be simple
carelessness and such a lack of care on plaintiffs part will not bar or reduce his damages.
See RESTATEmENT 402A, supra note 4, Comment n; HuRsH & BAILEY, supra note 1, § 4:37. If
the defendant can prove that the plaintiff unreasonably and voluntarily subjected himself to
a known danger, then he has proved assumption of the risk, HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 1, §
4:36, and the plaintiff's recovery will be reduced by comparative negligence principles. 81
N.J. at 160, 164, 406 A.2d at 144, 157. Assumption of the risk can be described as a "consid-
ered choice to chance injury." 81 N.J. at 199, 406 A.2d at 165 (Clifford, J., concurring). In a
jurisdiction which does not apply comparative negligence to strict products liability, proof of
plaintiff's assumption of the risk will operate as a complete bar to recovery. See RESTATE-
MENT 402A, supra note 4, Comment n. Where comparative negligence is applied, plaintiff's
assumption of the risk will only reduce the amount of his recovery. 81 N.J. at 163-64, 406
A.2d at 146-47.
11 The trial jury found Suter to be 50% at fault and therefore the trial judge reduced his
damages by half. 81 N.J. at 155, 405 A.2d at 142. The Appellate Division restored the full
amount to Suter, id., and the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 177, 406 A.2d at
153.
' Id. at 168, 177, 406 A.2d at 149, 153. In holding as a matter of law that comparative
negligence does not apply in an employee-industrial setting, the Suter court overruled a case
it had decided just a year earlier, Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d
816 (1978). The Cepeda plaintiff lost four fingers when his hand became entangled in plastic
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tent was to include strict products liability within the comparative negli-
gence statute, but that the lack of meaningful choice available to an
employee in an industrial plant justified an exception in the case of such
an employee."'
The Suter court approved the consumer expectation test 6 2 as a defini-
tion of defect. 3 The court met the criticism that the consumer expecta-
tion test is ineffective when complicated products are being evaluated" by
developing a risk-utility based test to supplement the consumer expecta-
tion test."
The Suter risk-utility analysis defines abnormal uses" as those for
which a manufacturer could not reasonably foresee his product being
used.67 The court held that the feasibility of a safer design" may be deter-
mined by balancing the state of the art, industry standards, and practical
strips which were being fed into a cutting machine. The machine was being operated with-
out its fingerguard and plaintiff alleged that the machine should have been equipped with
an interlock switch to prevent the machine from running without the guard. The Cepeda
court held that assumption of the risk could be a defense to a strict products liability claim,
see note 58 supra, and remanded the case for a new trial to determine if the plaintiff had
unreasonably and voluntarily encountered the known risk of operating the machine without
a fingerguard. 76 N.J. at 190-91, 386 A.2d at 835-36. The Suter court overruled Cepeda on
the ground that an employee in an industrial setting has no "meaningful choice," since he is
under pressure to work rapidly or lose his job; and that therefore the actions of such an
employee are never voluntary enough to constitute assumption of the risk. Suter v. San
Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. at 167, 406 A.2d at 148. However, since voluntariness
is an element of assumption of risk to be determined by the facts of the particular case, see
id. at 197-99, 406 A.2d at 164-65 (Clifford, J., concurring), it is not appropriate to rule that
an employee can never voluntarily assume the risk. The Suter majority failed to realize that
the Cepeda ruling was wrong, not because as a matter of law employees cannot be negligent,
but because factually the Cepeda employee's conduct was both inadvertant and involuntary.
He inadvertantly caught his hand in the plastic strips and his hand was pulled into the
machine involuntarily. In Suter the plaintiff's conduct was also inadvertant, since he
brushed against the starting lever by accident. In both Suter and Cepeda the issue of as-
sumption of the risk should never have gone to the jury because there was no evidence of
voluntary conduct. Whether the Cepeda plaintiff won his case on remand was not known at
the time of the Suter decision, since no disposition had yet been reached. Telephone inter-
view with Mark D. Lamer of Budd, Lamer, Kent, Gross, Picillo & Rosenbaum, Cepeda's
attorney, (Nov. 9, 1979).
61 81N.J. at 168, 177, 406 A.2d at 149, 153.
62 See text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
81 N.J. at 170, 406 A.2d at 150.
' See note 25 supra.
81 N.J. at 170-71, 406 A.2d at 150-51. New Jersey is only one of several jurisdictions
that employ a consumer-expectation test supplemented in the alternative by a risk-utility
test. E.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alas. 1979); Barker v. Lull Eng'r
Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
" See note 46 supra and text accompanying notes 45-51 supra.
7 81 N.J. at 177, 406 A.2d at 153. The Suter court held that a product should be safe for
its "intended or foreseeable purposes", id., but, since the manufacturer obviously foresees
that his product may be used for the purpose for which he intends it to be used, the word
"intended" is redundant.
0 See text accompanying notes 34-41 supra.
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technology available at the time of the product's-sale." The court also
held that constructive knowledge of the product's propensity for causing
harm70 must be imputed to the seller,7 ' whether or not the seller could
have foreseen the likelihood that his product would cause harm.
72
The Suter definition of design defect *differs from negligence in two
ways. If the plaintiff can prove that the product did not meet consumer
expectations, then the product's defectiveness is established without any
proof of actual negligent conduct on the manufacturer's part.71 If the
plaintiff cannot utilize the consumer expectation test, then he may use
Suter's alternative risk-utility test, which differs from a negligence test by
not requiring that the propensity of the product for causing harm be fore-
seeable by the manufacturer.
7
The majority in Suter was criticized for its reliance on warranty and
negligence terminology in its formulation of a design defect definition.
75
The Suter court held that a strict products liability instruction could be
given in the warranty terms of reasonable fitness, suitability, and safety.
7
In view of the court's definition of fitness and suitability as "terms largely
synonymous with safety," however, the court's instruction means noth-
ing more than that the product must be safe. 8 The Suter court also held
that the jury could be instructed to determine whether a "reasonably pru-
dent" manufacturer knowing of the product's propensity for causing
harm, would market it in that condition.7" Although the term reasonably
prudent may be more apt in negligence, the Suter definition substantively
o, 81 N.J. at 170-71, 406 A.2d at 150-51.
7' See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
81 N.J. at 170, 406 A.2d at 150; see Wade, Nature, supra note 4, at 835. Wade advo-
cates that in strict products liability it should be assumed that the defendant knew of the
"dangerous condition" of the product. Id. at 834-35. Apparently, the elements determining
"dangerous condition" include the gravity of the injuries caused by the product, see note 32
supra, and the propensity of the product for causing harm. See Wade, Nature, supra note 4,
at 837; KIMBLE & LESHER, supra note 1, § 54E.
72 Where the manufacturer actually knows that his product is hazardous, but takes no
steps to redesign the product, he may be liable for punitive damages. E.g., Sturm, Ruger &
Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alas. 1979).
73 See text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
7' Note, Products Liability-"Unreasonable Danger" Eliminate'd from the Theory of
Strict Liability-The Restatement Restated, 42 FORDHAM L. RIv.-943, 952-53 (1974). In neg-
ligence the manufacturer is not liable for his product's harmful propensity unless he
breaches his duty to foresee that harmful propensity. Where it was not reasonably possible
for him to have foreseen such a harmful propensity, he has breached no duty. Suter's defini-
tion of strict products liability assumes that the manufacturer did foresee his product's
harmful propensity and thus assumes the element of proof that makes it difficult to prove
negligence. Id.
7' 81 N.J. at 178-92, 406 A.2d at 154-61 (Clifford, J., concurring).
7, Id. at 177, 406 A.2d at 153.
Id. at 169, 406 A.2d at 149.
7' The Suter court -was reluctant to reverse and remand the case when it could discern
no substantive difference between the warranty language used by the trial court and lan-
guage more appropriate to strict products liability. Id.
7, Id. at 171, 177, 406 A.2d at 150.
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differs from negligence because it imputes to the seller constructive
knowledge of the dangerous condition of the'product."° The Suter court's
use of negligence and *arranty language has little effect on the substan-
tive law of strict products liability as adopted in Suter.
In Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck" the Supreme Court of Alaska
adopted a definition of design defect that was based on both the consumer
expectation test and the risk-utility analysis,8" as employed in Suter.
Beck's formulation of its risk-utility analysis, however, differed from that
of Suter in both substance and in terminology.
In Beck, the plaintiff's husband was killed when a front-end loader
overturned on him."' The plaintiff alleged that the front-end loader was
defectively designed because it lacked a roll-over protection shield.8 The
Supreme Court of Alaska reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff and re-
manded the case for a new trial because of a jury instruction88 which erro-
neously based proof of the defect on proof of the injury alone." Therefore,
the court concluded that this instruction was tantamount to a charge of
absolute liability, rather than strict products liability." The court rea-
soned that, if the mere happening of an injury proved the existence of a
defect, then the requirement that a defect be proven, in effect, was
eliminated.
As did the Suter court,8" the Beck court approved the use of both the
consumer expectation test and risk-utility balancing as alternative tests. 0
In its formulation of risk-utility balancing, the Beck court agreed with the
Suter court's position on the evaluation of the feasibility of a safer de-
sign" and on abnormal use.2 However, the Beck court did not impute to
the seller constructive knowledge of his product's propensity for causing
See text accompanying notes 70-72 & 74 supra.
" 593 P.2d 871 (Alas. 1979).
52 See text accompanying notes 85-90 infra.
93 See text accompanying notes 92-94 & 102-04 infra.
" 593 P.2d at 875. The plaintiff's husband was driving the front-end loader on a dirt
road and, although there were no witnesses, it seems that the front-end loader sank into the
shoulder of the road, flipped over, and fell down an embankment. Id. at 874-75. Beck was
crushed beneath the front-end loader. Id. at 875. See note 24 supra.
Is A rollover protection shield is an overhead canopy constructed to withstand and occa-
sionally prevent rollovers. 593 P.2d at 875.
" The trial court's instruction charged the jury that a "design defect is one in which the
product, however perfectly manufactured, incorporates or fails to incorporate a design fea-
ture with the result that injury is proximately caused thereby." Id. at 876.
" Id. at 879.
u"Id.
'7 See text accompanying notes 62-65 supra.
593 P.2d at 884, 886.
" See text accompanying notes 34-41 supra. Suter held that the feasibility of a safer
design should be determined in light of the knowledge available at the time of the product's
sale. See text accompanying note 69 supra. Beck treated feasibility in the same manner. 593
P.2d at 886 n.52 & 887.
'2 See text accompanying notes 45-51 supra. Suter employed a foreseeability test to de-
termine if a use was abnormal. See note 67 supra and text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
Beck also employed a foreseeability test. 593 P.2d at 887.
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harm, as did the Suter court. 3 Instead, Beck formulated a foreseeability
test by evaluating the product's harmful propensity in light of the knowl-
edge available at the time of the product's sale. 4 Thus Beck evaluates all
risk-utility considerations in light of the information available at the time
of the product's sale. 5
Beck's reliance on the time of sale makes its definition of design defect
difficult to distinguish from the risk-utility balancing in negligence analy-
sis which also relies on the time of sale or manufacture. However, Beck
distinguishes its definition by allocating the burden of proof to the defen-
dant-seller. 7 All that the plaintiff need prove is that he suffered injury
proximately caused by the product. The seller may then defend by prov-
ing that the benefits of his design outweighed its risks. Therefore the
risk-utility balancing becomes an affirmative defense. 0° The court rea-
soned that this shift in the burden of proof would put that burden on the
party with the greatest access to and familiarity with the technical evi-
dence relevant to the balancing of risks against utility.9'
The Beck court exercised more care in its choice of terminology than
did the Suter court. The Beck court expressly rejected the use of such
language as "reasonable, prudent manufacturer."'' 2 Furthermore Beck
does not use warranty language in its risk-utility balancing' 3 as Suter
,2 See text accompanying notes 70-72 & 74 supra.
593 P.2d at 886 n.52. If the propensity of a product for causing harm is evaluated in
light of the knowledge available to the seller at the time he sells a product and if there were
nothing at that time to indicate that the product is harmful, then the manufacturer couldn't
have foreseen the dangerousness of the product. Under Suter this unforeseeability would not
absolve the defendant, see text accompanying notes 70-72 & 74 supra, but under Beck un-
foreseeability may absolve the defendant if the defendant affirmatively proves it. See text
accompanying notes 97-100, infra; see generally KmBoLE & LFSHER, supra note 1, § 73.
'1 See text accompanying notes 118-20 infra.
" See KrnmB & LESHER, supra note 1, §§ 73 & 81. Because negligence relies on the
concept of foreseeability, negligence necessarily relies on the knowledge available at the time
of the product's sale or manufacture. What cannot be known cannot be foreseen.
" 593 P.2d at 886-87.
Is Id.
" Id.
10 The Beck court did not address the issue of which party must plead that the benefits
of the design are outweighed by its risks or vice-versa. However, the court held that the
plaintiff need only prove that he was injured by the product, id. at 886, and then referred to
this proof as the plaintiff's prima facie case. Id. at 887. Thus it seems to follow that the
plaintiff must plead injury and proximate causation, while the seller-defendant must plead
non-defectiveness.
"I Id. at 887.
"0 Id. at 883-84. The Beck court reasoned that terminology such as "reasonable, pru-
dent manufacturer" would tend to focus the jury's attention on the defendant-manufac-
turer's conduct, instead of on the product and its defectiveness or lack thereof. Id.
10 The Beck court formulated its general risk-utility test as follows: "[A] product is
defectively designed if: . . . the plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately
caused injury and the defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant [risk-utility] factors,
that on balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in
such a design." Id. at 886.
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Relying on negligence terminology 5 the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals formulated a strict products liability definition of defect in
Morningstar v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co.' 0 The case was certi-
fied from a Federal District Court"0 7 to ascertain whether West Virginia
recognized strict products liability and, if so, what the substantive con-
tent of West Virginia's strict products liability entailed.' The
Morningstar plaintiff was injured when the safety guard on his power saw
failed to close." 9 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that
West Virginia would recognize and apply the principles of strict products
liability."'
The Morningstar definition of defect"' is not based on two alternative
test as in the Suter 2 and Beck decisions;"' nor does it include the con-
sumer-expectation test, but instead, it is based entirely on risk-utility bal-
ancing."' As in Suter,"5 Morningstar's risk-utility analysis imputes to the
seller constructive knowledge of the product's propensity for causing
harm."' In its evaluation of the feasibility of a safer design, however, the
Morningstar court would allow a jury to consider evidence of the state of
,04 Suter held that the "manufacturer has an obligation to distribute products which are
reasonably fit, suitable, and safe. . . ." Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J.
150, 177, 406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979).
' See text accompanying notes 124-27 supra.
200 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979).
" Morningstar was certified by the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of West Virginia pursuant to W. VA. CODE § 51-1A-1. 253 S.E.2d at 668. Morningstar
was the first case the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decided pursuant to West
Virginia's federal certification statute, id., although the court had decided previously cases
certified by the lower West Virginia courts under a similar statute. Id. at 669.
1" 253 S.E.2d at 668.
1O Id. The Morningstar court did not set forth any of the details of the plaintiff's acci-
dent. The court noted that Mrs. Morningstar sued for loss of consortium, but never reached
the issue of whether loss of consortium is compensable under strict products liability. Id.
11 Id. at 680, 683.
- The Morningstar definition of defect includes manufacturing defects as well as design
defects. Id. at 682-83. The definition is set forth below:
[Tlhe general test for establishing strict liability in tort is whether the involved
product is defective in the sense that is is not reasonably safe for its intended use.
The standard of reasonable safeness is determined not by the particular manufac-
turer, but by what a reasonably prudent manufacturer's standards should have
been at the time the product was made.
Id. at 683.
"1 See text accompanying notes 62-65 supra.
" See text accompanying note 90 supra.
11, 253 S.E.2d at 682. The court held that the considerations weighed in the risk-utility
analysis should be used to restrict the issues to which experts can testify. Id. Utilizing the
risk utility approach to set the bounds of expert testimony differs little from employing risk-
utility analysis in jury instructions, since in both situations the jury is ultimately presented
with the same information on which to base their judgment.
"5 See text accompanying notes 70-72 supra.
,' 253 S.E.2d at 682.
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the art at the time of the manufacture of the product.17 Suter and Beck
allow evidence of state of the art at the time of the product's sale."' Al-
though the difference between the time of the manufacture of a product
and the time of its sale is usually insignificant, the technology available
at the time of manufacture may be obsolete by the time of the product's
sale, where a product remains warehoused or remains on the retailer's
shelf for a long period of time."" In such a case, the seller should be liable
for the 'product's obsolesence while the product is in his control.' 0
Morningstar defines an abnormal use as a use that a reasonable pru-
dent person would not make of the product.' 2 Suter and Beck both held
that an abnormal use is a use not foreseeable by the seller. 22 There is
little substantive difference between these two tests because a reasonable
seller will foresee the uses to which reasonable persons will put his prod-
uct.'1 However, the Morningstar abnormal use test focuses on the uses
people will make of the product, whereas the Suter and Beck test focuses
on the manufacturer's ability to foresee what uses people will make of the
product. Therefore the Morningstar abnormal use test directs the jury's
attention toward the product which is being evaluated and avoids focus-
ing on the manufacturer's conduct, which is not at issue in a strict prod-
ucts liability action.
Morningstar's general definition of defect uses negligence language
similar to that used in Suter.'2 4 The Morningstar court held that a product
"I The Morningstar court held that the safeness of the product should be evaluated as
of the time it was made. See note 111 supra. However, the time of sale is the time at which
the evaluation should be made. See text accompanying notes 117-20 infra. Since the
Morningstar court was not dealing with a factual situation in which there was any signifi-
cant difference between the time of manufacture and the time of sale, it is probable that the
court's language was simply imprecise and that, faced with the issue, the court would choose
the time of sale.
, See text accompanying notes 63-69 & 91 supra.
" In strict products liability the seller is liable only for a defect which existed at the
time the product left the seller's control. RESTATEMENT 402A, supra note 4, Comment g; IM-
BLE & LmsHER, supra note 1, § 57. The seller should therefore be liable, if the product was
obsolete at the time he sold it. KumLE & LES HER, supra note 1, § 133; O'Donnell supra note
36, at 633.
"I The time of sale is ordinarily the time when the product leaves the defendant's con-
trol, but in the case of a lessor-defendant, see Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental
Serv., Inc., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965), or in the case of a promotional giveaway of
products, the product is not sold. In such cases the time when the product leaves the hands
of the defendant should determine whether a design alternative was feasible.
121 253 S.E.2d at 683.
11 See text accompanying notes 66-67 & 92 supra.
"2 In determining what uses a reasonable person would make of a product, the fact that
the plaintiff is a child should not imply that the plaintiff's mishandling of the product is
unreasonable. Small children are attracted, quite reasonably, to swimming pools and if they
drown because the pool was not guarded by a gate, recovery should be denied only if a
reasonable child would not have entered the pool. See note 25 supra.
12 See note 111 supra. Suter held that the jury should be instructed to determine
whether "the manufacturer, it being deemed to have known of the harmful propensity of the
product, acted as a reasonably prudent one." Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81
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is defective if it is not "reasonably safe" in terms of the standards of a
"reasonably prudent manufacturer.""' However, since Morningstar im-
putes to the seller constructive knowledge of the product's propensity to
cause harm, 2 ' as does Suter, the Morningstar definition of defect differs
substantively from negligence.2'
Linguistic purists will prefer cases like Beck which carefully avoid the
use of negligence and warranty language in the formulation of a strict
products liability definition of defect. Suter and Morningstar, however
misleading their language, do establish design defect definitions which are
compatible with strict products liability.
All three courts have expanded the seller's liability in order to achieve
the policy goal of risk-spreading. Beck accomplishes this expansion by
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, while Morningstar and
Suter achieve the same end by imputing to the seller constructive knowl-
edge of his product's harmful propensity. All three courts have avoided
the extreme of unlimited liability by ensuring that the requirement of a
defect has more substantive content than mere proof of injury caused by a
product.
In light of the fact that few of the actual medical costs incurred by
those injured by products are ever reimbursed,'2 it is probable that the
courts have not yet expanded sellers' liability to the degree necessary to
allocate most of product risks away from the injured. However, in view of
the growing opposition to further extensions of sellers' liability,2 , the
courts may wish to defer to legislative evaluation of the need for further
allocation of the costs of product-related harm. Should a court decide that
further expansion of the seller's liability is desirable, one method by
which such an expansion could be accomplished is both to shift the bur-
den of proof to the seller, as Beck did, and to impute to the manufacturer
constructive knowledge of his products' harmfulness, as did the courts in
Morningstar and Suter.
GORDON EDWARD BILLHEIMER, JR.
N.J. 150, 177, 406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979).
'" See note 111 supra.
211 See text accompanying note 116 supra.
'1 See text accompanying notes 70-72 & 74 supra.
'12 See O'Connell, supra note 13, at 19.
' See Bivins, The Products Liability Crisis: Modest Proposals For Legislative Reform,
11 AKRON L. lRv. 595, 595-97 (1978).
